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aturalistic moral realists hold that moral properties are part of 
the natural world.1 They can accept either reductionism or nonreduc-
tionism about how moral properties relate to properties invoked in the 
best natural and social scientific explanations, which I call “scientific proper-
ties.”2 This article argues that reductionism is the best form of naturalistic moral 
realism.
Reductionism and nonreductionism differ about whether moral properties 
and scientific properties are identical.3 Reductionists see moral properties as 
identical to individual scientific properties or disjunctions of scientific proper-
ties. Supposing for illustration that hedonism is the true theory of moral value, 
reductionism treats goodness as identical to pleasure, just as water is identical 
to H2O.4 Nonreductionists see moral properties as natural properties superven-
ing on and constituted by scientific properties without being identical to them.5 
1 My characterization of the positions follows Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, “Toward Fin de 
Siècle Ethics”; Miller, Contemporary Metaethics; and Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism.
2 “Scientific properties” refers to properties of physics, biology, psychology, and other natural 
and social sciences, but not moral properties unless they are identical to these properties. I 
know no better term. “Nonmoral properties” makes reductionism sound contradictory in 
claiming that moral properties are nonmoral, “natural properties” makes nonreductionism 
sound nonnaturalist in denying that moral properties are natural, and “descriptive proper-
ties” erects a false contrast, as realists regard moral language as descriptive. “Natural kinds” 
may be an equivalent term, though I do not know how broadly it is used this way. These 
positions are stated in terms of the abundant view of properties. The sparse view will be 
discussed shortly.
3 While reduction in some contexts does not entail identity, I defend property identity, which 
is part of strong-reductive theses. Schroeder regards reduction as property analysis rather 
than property identity (Slaves of the Passions). Our views are compatible, since he allows 
identity claims like the one defended here to fit within a property analysis.
4 More technically, “goodness is identical to being pleasure.” Following much of the metaeth-
ics literature, I usually omit the “being” and talk of property existence rather than instantia-
tion.
5 While nonnaturalists like Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism) and Huemer (Ethical Intuition-
N
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Again assuming hedonism for illustration, nonreductionism treats goodness 
as supervening on pleasure without identity. The Cornell Realists liken this to 
how psychological properties supervene on neuroscientific properties in Jerry 
Fodor’s influential view of the special sciences.6
Both views share many features. They address the conceptual is/ought gap 
by agreeing with G. E. Moore that normative ethical truths are synthetic and not 
analytic.7 They reject his view that moral properties are nonnatural. They answer 
John Mackie’s argument that moral properties are unacceptably queer by deny-
ing that they produce categorical reasons.8
Today, nonreductionism is the dominant form of synthetic naturalistic mor-
al realism.9 Russ Shafer-Landau describes the consensus, writing of Richard 
Boyd’s moral semantics:
Boyd himself does not believe that application of his theory will yield a 
reductive view . . . no one has supplied any reason for thinking that he has 
ism) also hold that moral properties supervene on nonmoral properties without identity, 
they deny that moral properties are natural properties. This makes an intuitionist moral 
epistemology suit their views better, and may have other consequences for their metaethical 
theorizing.
6 Brink (Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics) provides the most comprehensive de-
fense of nonreductionism, likening his position to Fodor’s metaphysics of mind (“Special 
Sciences”). Sayre-McCord similarly defends “belief in two kinds of properties: those which 
can be reductively identified with explanatorily potent properties and those we have in-
dependent reason to think supervene upon, without being strictly reducible to, explana-
torily potent properties” (“Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence,” 274). This view is 
often attributed to Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” and Boyd, “How to Be a Moral Realist.” 
Their metaethical approach is called “Cornell Realism” because Sturgeon, Boyd, and Brink 
were affiliated with Cornell University (whose press published Sayre-McCord’s anthology). 
Boyd’s and Sturgeon’s criticisms of reductionism are less explicitly focused on synthetic 
reductionism. Boyd criticizes “the conclusion that all natural properties must be definable 
in the vocabulary of physics” (“How to Be a Moral Realist,” 194), and Sturgeon repeatedly 
criticizes “reductive definitions” (“Moral Explanations,” 240–43). Harman (“Moral Expla-
nations of Natural Facts”) notes that these remarks can be read merely as criticisms of an-
alytic reductionism, as definition is primarily a semantic notion rather than an ontological 
notion. So I focus on Brink and Sayre-McCord here.
7 Moore, Principia Ethica. If Moore is wrong about moral semantics, the door is open for ana-
lytic reductionists like Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Finlay, Confusion of Tongues. 
8 Mackie, Ethics. For arguments favoring naturalists’ rejection of categorical reasons, see Foot, 
“Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” and Svavarsdóttir, “Moral Cognitivism 
and Motivation.”
9 Railton (“Moral Realism,” “Naturalism and Prescriptivity”) and Jackson (From Metaphysics 
to Ethics, “In Defense of Reductionism in Ethics”) offer sympathetic treatments of reduc-
tionism. But they respond to anti-realists and nonnaturalists rather than naturalistic nonre-
ductionists.
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erred in this regard. No one has done anything towards showing that his 
semantics, when well applied, would yield the surprising conclusion that 
goodness (and rightness, and forbiddenness, etc.) is identical to some 
specific natural property.10
This consensus should be overturned. Naturalistic moral realists should accept 
identities between moral properties and scientific properties, even if they be-
lieve that properties of special sciences like psychology are not identical to prop-
erties of neuroscience or physics. If reduction is easier than Fodor allows, ethical 
reductionists may have more resources at their disposal than I use here.11 But 
even if reductionism fails in psychology, it succeeds in ethics.
Ethical nonreductionists borrow two arguments from Fodor’s philosophy of 
mind, which the two main sections of this article answer. First, nonreductionists 
argue that the multiple realizability of moral properties defeats reductionism. I 
solve multiple realizability in ethics by identifying moral properties uniquely or 
disjunctively with special science properties. This eliminates the main purport-
ed disadvantage of reductionism. Second, nonreductionists argue that irreduc-
ible moral properties explain empirical phenomena, just as irreducible special 
science properties do. But since irreducible moral properties do not succeed 
in explaining additional regularities, error theorists can rightly say that they are 
pseudoscientific. Since reductionism entails the existence of moral properties 
when combined with the existence of the reduction bases, it is the more defensi-
ble form of naturalistic moral realism.
In recent years, the popularity of nonnaturalistic realism has exceeded that 
of naturalistic realism.12 The dialectical situation makes this unsurprising. The 
best-known versions of naturalistic realism are the Cornell Realists’ nonreduc-
tionism with its dubious moral explanations, and Jackson’s reductionism with its 
ties to a very different philosophy of mind than the one that the Cornell Realists 
invoke against their opponents. I show that, even on the philosophy of the spe-
cial sciences the Cornell Realists assumed, reductionism can accommodate all 
existing normative ethical theories while avoiding dubious empirical commit-
ments, making it the best form of naturalistic realism.
10 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 68–69.
11 Against Fodor are Kim, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” and So-
ber, “The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism.” To see how disjunctive 
properties might provide reduction bases, see Clapp, “Disjunctive Properties.”
12 Especially influential are Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously; Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism; 
Parfit, On What Matters; and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other.
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1. Multiple Realizability Does Not 
Endanger Ethical Reductionism
This section responds to the argument that multiple realizability defeats re-
ductionism. David Brink presents this argument clearly and uses it to motivate 
nonreductionism. I compare his position to Fodor’s nonreductionism in philos-
ophy of mind, and respond with a solution for multiple realizability in ethics: 
identifying moral properties with natural kinds from sciences like psychology 
and sociology, uniquely or disjunctively. This makes reductionism as good as 
nonreductionism for accommodating all currently defended normative ethical 
theories.
Brink invokes multiple realizability to defend nonreductionism, which he 
calls “constitutional materialism,” against reductionism, which he calls “identity 
materialism”:
There are what should by now be familiar reasons to prefer constitution-
al to identity materialism. If materialism is only contingently true, then 
higher-order properties, though actually physical properties, could have 
been realized nonphysically. If so, these higher-order properties are not 
necessarily physical properties and so cannot be identical with physical 
properties. Moreover, higher-order properties and property instances 
could have been realized in a variety of different physical ways. If we deny 
that identity is a relation that can hold between relata that are indefinitely 
or infinitely disjunctive, the multiple realizability of these higher-order 
properties provides reason to deny that they are identical with physical 
properties.13
I summarize Brink’s two multiple realizability arguments against reductionism.
First, moral properties like wrongness could be realized even in worlds with 
different fundamental properties. In a nonphysical world, it would be wrong for 
ghosts to torture other ghosts. And in a world whose fundamental physics dif-
fers from that of our world, slavery would still be just as wrong. Since things 
could be wrong in worlds that do not have our physics, wrongness cannot be 
identical to properties of our physics. This argument parallels arguments against 
reducing mental properties to neural properties: since robots and aliens who 
lack humanlike brains can have beliefs, belief cannot be identical to anything 
from neuroscience.
Second, many different actual physical structures realize wrongness. Slavery, 
gender discrimination, and torture have little in common at the level of physics 
13 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, 178.
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that distinguishes them from things that are not wrong. Wrongness and belief 
are equally unlikely to have unified or even finite characterizations in the lan-
guage of physics. Brink rejects identifying higher-level properties with infinitely 
disjunctive lower-level properties. This argument parallels arguments against re-
ducing mental properties to properties of physics: belief cannot be identical to 
anything from physics, since it is constituted in such disunified ways at that level.
Brink’s arguments share the structure of those against reductionism in the 
philosophy of mind.14 On these reductionist views, mental states like belief and 
desire are identical to states from physics or neuroscience.15 The problem for 
reductionism is that one could have the same mental state by having any of many 
physical structures. For example, the belief that philosophy is fun need not be 
realized by neurons. Robots and aliens could have the same belief, realized by sil-
icon chips or whatever is in aliens’ heads. Believing that philosophy is fun cannot 
be identical to anything neurological, biological, or physical, because creatures 
can do it by having any among an infinite disjunction of different neurological, 
biological, and physical structures.16 I call this form of multiple realizability “in-
finite realizability.”
Brink’s theory of how moral properties relate to lower-level properties is ex-
plicitly built on Fodor’s model, which accommodates infinite realizability while 
maintaining an attractive physicalist thesis.17 On Fodor’s view, each science is a 
14 Fodor, “Explanations in Psychology”; Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States.” Here I do not 
focus on a powerful nonreductionist argument from the material constitution debate that 
concerns modal properties of ordinary objects: the statue cannot survive squashing, while 
its constituent clay survives squashing, so the statue is not identical to the clay. Nonreduc-
tionism about statues can plausibly claim to explain why their modal properties differ from 
those of their constituent clay, but the parallel argument for metaethical nonreductionism 
fails. Removing the goodness of any state of affairs requires removing whatever property of 
the state of affairs made it good. So you cannot destroy the goodness without destroying 
the underlying property specified by the right theory of goodness. Paul provides a helpful 
discussion of material constitution (“The Puzzles of Material Constitution”).
15 Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”; Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”; Smart, 
“Sensations and Brain Processes.” Bennett, “Mental Causation,” provides an overview.
16 Here I discuss ontology in terms of properties rather than facts, following Fodor.
17 Brink cites Fodor’s “Special Sciences” four times, the last two specifically to support ethical 
nonreductionism with multiple realizability arguments (Moral Realism and the Foundations 
of Ethics, 166, 167, 180, 194). No existing work has shown that Fodor’s arguments do not 
carry over to moral properties as Brink thinks they do. Jackson’s discussion of Cornell Re-
alism (From Metaphysics to Ethics) does not distinguish reductionists like Railton from nat-
uralistic nonreductionists like Brink and Sayre-McCord. His article with Pettit and Smith 
(“Ethical Particularism and Patterns”) and his later work (“In Defense of Reductionism in 
Ethics”) respond to Dancy, Parfit, and other nonnaturalists who do not share Fodor’s meta-
physics of natural and causally effective but irreducible properties.
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separate layer of irreducible properties. Physics is the bottom layer, and proper-
ties like “belief ” from the special-science layer of psychology need not be iden-
tical to any properties of physics or other sciences. Still, every actual belief is a 
physical thing. The language of physics allows a full characterization of every 
individual human, robot, and alien belief, even if it does not give us a well-uni-
fied general characterization to cover all of them. As Fodor concludes “Special 
Sciences”: “If physics is to be basic science, then each of these things had better 
be a physical thing. But it is not further required that the taxonomies which the 
special sciences employ must themselves reduce to the taxonomy of physics. It 
is not required, and it is probably not true.”18
Having presented these multiple realizability arguments, I explain how ethi-
cal reductionism answers them. Moral properties are reducible either to individ-
ual special science properties as water is reducible to H2O, or to disjunctions of 
them as jade is reducible to jadeite or nephrite. A finitely disjunctive reduction 
base provides the flexibility to accommodate the most complex existing moral 
theories. Locating the reduction base at the special-science level allows finite 
realizers across physical and nonphysical worlds.
Normative ethical theories typically give accounts of the moral in terms of 
the psychological, social, or biological. On a reductionist metaethical treatment, 
the moral and scientific terms refer to the same properties. The easiest cases for 
reductionism are monistic theories like hedonism about moral value, on which 
something is good iff it is pleasure. This is a full account of a moral property—
goodness—in terms of a psychological property—pleasure. While many meta-
ethical views are open to hedonists, a natural one is the reductionist view that 
goodness is pleasure.
Of course, many moral theories are more complex, and do not seek to unify 
all of morality under one principle. These pluralist theories provide type-reduc-
tions of moral properties to disjunctive reduction bases. Moore takes aesthetic 
appreciation and friendship to have moral value that goes beyond the pleasure 
experienced. Reductionists treat his normative ethics as describing the com-
binations of psychological and sociological properties that make up aesthetic 
appreciation and friendship, and to which goodness is reducible. Goodness, on 
this view, is reducible to pleasure or aesthetic appreciation or friendship. To ac-
commodate more good things, one simply needs more disjuncts.
One might object that disjunctive properties cannot provide reduction bases 
for higher-level properties, so reductionism will not accommodate more com-
plex moral theories. Fodor claims that belief cannot be reduced to a big, disuni-
fied disjunction of neural, silicon, and alien states because it is a natural kind 
18 Fodor, “Special Sciences,” 114.
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that should provide unified explanations. Jade is not a natural-kind term in the 
special sciences because it is disjunctively realized by jadeite and nephrite. So 
jade is not a natural kind. Jadeite explains some geological phenomena while 
nephrite explains others, but their disjunction does not explain things. If we 
similarly cannot reduce moral properties to disjunctions of scientific properties, 
reductionism will be an option only for monistic moral theories like hedonism.
Moral properties, however, can have have disjunctive reduction bases, since 
moral concepts do not require unified roles for moral properties in scientific ex-
planations. So moral properties can be disjunctions of natural kinds rather than 
natural kinds themselves. Reductionists can let goodness be like jade—a real 
thing in the natural world that is not a natural kind. Denying that jade is a natural 
kind is not denying that jade exists. If your brother wants some phlogiston and 
your sister wants a jade necklace, only one of them must be disappointed. Just as 
those wanting jade necklaces need not be disappointed, those who want to make 
the world a better place need not be disappointed if goodness is a disjunction of 
natural kinds.19 Objective features of the natural world then satisfy the predicate 
“good,” making naturalistic moral realism true.
This disjunctive solution gives naturalistic moral realists what they care 
about, even on a sparse view of properties.20 For ease of exposition, most of this 
article assumes an abundant view of properties on which there is a (nonscientif-
ic) property of being jade, since there are (scientific) properties of being jadeite 
and being nephrite. This abundant view makes disjunctions of scientific proper-
ties identical to moral properties. To show that reductionism saves realism even 
without assuming the abundant view, we might consider sparse views, on which 
there is no property of being jade—only being jadeite and being nephrite. Then 
if pluralism makes the reduction base of goodness disjunctive, there is no prop-
erty of goodness. This may sound like victory for the error theorist, but it is not. 
Goodness still exists, as a disjunction of properties that exists without deserving 
to be called a property. Beliefs about it will be true because of disjunctions of sci-
entific properties, rather than an individual moral property that is an individual 
scientific property. Reductionists can be open-minded about whether goodness 
is a property as long as they can identify it with scientific properties, uniquely 
or disjunctively.
19 As Jackson writes, “Jade, it turned out, comes in two quite different forms (nephrite and 
jadeite), but this did not lead us to deny the existence of jade. It led us to say there are two 
kinds where we might have thought that there was only one” (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 
112).
20 See Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism. The abundant versus sparse terminology comes 
from Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. Abundant views are better at tracking when predi-
cates refer, while sparse views support useful metaphysical distinctions.
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To be compatible with folk belief, the sparse view must allow disjunctions 
of properties to satisfy nondisjunctive predicates like “good” in this way. Most 
of the things we care about are not natural kinds with a one-to-one correspon-
dence to sparse properties. They are instances of highly gerrymandered kinds 
like the sonnets that poets write, the whiskies that drinkers enjoy, and the jobs 
that academic philosophers seek. The sparse theorist can say that there is no 
property of being a job, but should not say that the predicate “job” fails to refer 
to anything real. Denying that “job” refers because a single predicate must refer 
to a single property would force the sparse theorist to give up on having a job! 
Sparse theorist David Armstrong avoided this bad result and got a job that let 
him write, “In the theory of properties, it is in general a mistake to look for a one-
one correlation to hold between properties and predicates.”21 If it turns out that 
goodness is metaphysically like water, jade, or jobs, belief in goodness can be 
true and moral realism is vindicated. Whether goodness is a property does not 
matter to reductionists as long as scientific properties satisfy “good” in some way. 
So the important question is not whether goodness is a natural kind that belongs 
on the sparse theorist’s list of properties. It is whether belief in goodness is false 
like belief in phlogiston, or true like belief in water, jade, and jobs.
The example of jade shows why reductionist metaethical views are compat-
ible with even the most complex existing normative ethical theories.22 It is an 
interesting question whether reductionism is compatible with a moral theory 
suggesting an infinitely long reduction base, or whether only nonreductionism 
could handle infinite realizability, as Brink suggests. No moral theory that I know 
of claims that the number of moral principles is infinite. Jonathan Dancy’s par-
ticularism comes closest. But his view concerns the role of principles in moral 
thought and judgment rather than whether moral properties are infinitely real-
izable.23 So infinite realizability, which reductionism in the philosophy of mind 
21 Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 6.
22 Many philosophers discuss whether a “reductionist” view makes sense of thick concepts 
like “cruel,” as Roberts discusses (“Thick Concepts”). But this reductionism is an analysis of 
these concepts into evaluative and non-evaluative components suggested by noncognitiv-
ists like Blackburn who defend a ontological distinction between fact and value (“Through 
Thick and Thin”). My reductionism proposes fact-value property identities, rejecting this 
distinction. The issue of thick concepts was initially raised by cognitivist and naturalist 
Philippa Foot (“Moral Arguments”). For a treatment of thick concepts that makes them 
compatible with naturalism, see Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty.
23 Dancy has confirmed this in personal communication. He defines particularism as the view 
that “the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision 
of a suitable supply of moral principles” (Ethics without Principles, 7). A finite number of 
principles too large for human moral thought to apply would support his arguments. There 
is little motivation for insisting that the number of principles is literally infinite. What sort 
40 Sinhababu
must face, seems to be absent from ethics. Even on the most complex theories, 
moral properties can be understood as identical to finite disjunctions of natural 
kinds, like jade. Reductionism does not force us to accept monistic normative 
ethical theories that are overly simplistic. Jade is the model of how reductionism 
handles complex theories that do not identify moral properties with unique nat-
ural kinds.
So far, I have argued that moral properties are identical to special science 
properties, uniquely like H2O/water or in finite disjunctions like jade/jade-
ite-or-nephrite, but not that they are identical to anything from fundamental 
physics. They may not be, since their special-science realizers probably are in-
finitely realizable at the level of fundamental physics. Even if the case of jade con-
vinces you that finite realizability permits reduction of properties that are not 
natural kinds, you might join Brink in denying that anything can be reduced to 
an infinite disjunction and reject ethical reductionism because moral properties 
are infinitely realizable at the level of physics. So I explain why ethical reduction-
ism succeeds if moral properties are infinitely realizable at the level of physics, as 
long as they are finitely realized at levels like psychology or sociology.
Reducing moral properties merely requires their being identical to some sci-
entific properties, not necessarily those of physics. As Thomas Polger explains, 
realizability is relational, holding between particular sciences rather than abso-
lutely.24 Consider the water/H2O-type identity. Suppose it surprisingly turned 
out that protons were realizable by an infinite range of different arrangements of 
quarks. H2O and water would then be infinitely realizable at the fundamental 
physical level, since the protons in the atoms would be infinitely realizable at that 
level. But this would give us no reason to reject the water/H2O-type identity! It 
would still be a necessary truth that water is H2O. Identity would ground this ne-
cessity. While type-reduction would fail between protons and quarks, it would 
hold between water and H2O. This is how moral properties relate to the spe-
cial-science properties invoked in moral theories. Moral properties are infinite-
ly realizable at the level of physics only because their special-science reduction 
bases—pleasure, actions caused by a mental state specified by deontologists, or 
a disjunction specified in some more complex moral theory—are infinitely real-
izable at that level. Type-reduction can still hold between moral properties and 
special-science properties.
The relational nature of realizability answers Brink’s multiple realizability 
objections. Reductionists can accept that the special-science reduction bases 
of normative ethical data could only be explained with infinite principles? Simplicity princi-
ples may also help keep naturalists away from infinitely complex moral theories.
24 Polger, “Two Confusions concerning Multiple Realization.”
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of moral properties may themselves be infinitely realizable at the level of phys-
ics. Treating others as ends in themselves presumably is infinitely realizable in 
worlds sharing our fundamental physics, and especially across the space of meta-
physical possibility. But moral properties may still be type-reducible to tidy sets 
of special-science properties. Reductionists who see the Formula of Humani-
ty as the sole normative ethical principle can simply say that however treating 
others merely as means is physically or nonphysically realized, it is identical to 
wrongness. Lying will then be wrong for humans, aliens, and ghosts.25 The in-
finite physical and nonphysical realizers of moral properties are already accom-
modated between the fundamental properties and psychology by nonreduc-
tionism about the special sciences. No more accommodation is needed between 
psychology and ethics, making nonreductionism unnecessary there.
2. Nonreductionism’s Explanatory Problem 
and Reductionism’s Solution
This section examines arguments that nonreductionism lets moral properties ex-
plain phenomena just as special-science properties do. I respond that irreducible 
moral properties do not add to our explanations of observed regularities, giving 
naturalists no reason to believe in them. Reductionism uniquely or disjunctively 
identifies moral properties with scientific properties that add to our explana-
tions of regularities, justifying belief in them. While nonreductionism cannot 
answer error theorists’ epistemological arguments, reductionism can.
Gilbert Harman famously argues that irreducible moral properties do not 
explain our observations.26 This is a problem because naturalists are reluctant 
to believe in properties that do not explain our observations. Nonreduction-
ists respond by noting the role of irreducible properties in special sciences like 
psychology and suggesting that moral properties play a similar role, explaining 
regularities unexplained by the properties that they supervene on.27 Here oppo-
25 For ghosts’ actions to be wrong, we need not include supernatural properties in the reduc-
tion base. Reductionists should instead identify wrongness with more familiar properties 
like treating others merely as means. Even if these familiar properties supervene on su-
pernatural properties in ghostly worlds, they do so without identity, so instantiating them 
does not require instantiating supernatural properties. Otherwise, treating others merely as 
means could not happen in our world, which lacks the supernatural properties. The multi-
ple realizability of the mental is inconsistent with reductive supernaturalism, just as with 
reductive physicalism.
26 Harman, “Ethics and Observation.” Audi, “Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power 
of Moral Concepts,” and Thomson, “Reply to Critics,” raise similar issues.
27 As Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton observe, “Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Boyd, David Brink, 
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nents of nonreductionism can concede that irreducible properties of some spe-
cial sciences explain phenomena, perhaps as higher-level causes or in program 
explanation.28 This concession leaves open the empirical question of whether 
moral properties explain phenomena. It does not entail that they actually ex-
plain phenomena, just as it does not entail that irreducible astrological or al-
chemical properties explain phenomena. Higher-level causation and program 
explanation should not save astrology and alchemy along with morality! Simply 
allowing irreducible properties to participate in explanations does not tell us 
why irreducible moral properties succeed while irreducible astrological proper-
ties fail. Here we should recall why we posit irreducible special-science proper-
ties in the first place.
Irreducible special-science properties are worth positing because they pro-
vide unified explanations of observed regularities that more fundamental prop-
erties explain only in a disunified way. Fodor writes that the sciences “state such 
true, counterfactual supporting generalizations as there are to state.”29 These gen-
eralizations are systematic and unified accounts of regularities, some of which 
resist unified characterization in the language of physics. Reducing psychology 
to physics would prevent its laws from being well-unified, as they would involve 
huge disjunctions of physical states producing huge disjunctions of other phys-
ical states.30 Psychological laws also seem to hold under different fundamental 
laws, perhaps in possible worlds in which a different version of string theory is 
true, or where nonphysical ghosts have psychologies like ours. So psychological 
properties could be instantiated without actual physical properties. This is why 
we need irreducible special-science properties as well as those of fundamental 
physics. If the regularities psychology describes did not exist, or if physics or 
and others have pursued analogies with natural and social science to argue that moral proper-
ties might be both irreducible and explanatorily efficacious,” “Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics,” 26.
28 Majors argues that properties of special sciences like psychology are genuine causes, so 
moral properties could be causes as well (“Moral Explanation in the Special Sciences”). 
Nelson (“Moral Realism and Program Explanation”) argues that moral explanations can 
be “program explanations” in which higher-level properties “program for” the existence 
of lower-level properties that really explain things, as Miller (Contemporary Metaethics) 
considers.
29 Fodor, “Special Sciences,” 114.
30 Against disjunctive laws and natural kinds, Fodor writes: “I think, for example, that it is 
a law that the irradiation of green plants by sunlight causes carbohydrate synthesis, and I 
think that it is a law that friction causes heat, but I do not think that it is a law that (either 
the irradiation of green plants by sunlight or friction) causes (either carbohydrate synthesis 
or heat). Correspondingly, I doubt that ‘is either carbohydrate synthesis or heat’ is plausibly 
taken to be a natural kind predicate” (“Special Sciences,” 109). He sees reductionism about 
mental states as providing similar disunity, with its huge disjunctions in the reduction base. 
 Ethical Reductionism 43
some other science explained them with equal unity, accepting irreducible psy-
chological properties would be ontologically extravagant.
While psychology passes this test, many empirical theories have failed. Even 
if astrological claims occasionally accord with data (some Capricorns are ambi-
tious), they do not explain additional regularities. The ambition of these Capri-
corns will be explained by biological, developmental, and social factors that leave 
no regularities for irreducible astrological properties to explain. So we reject ir-
reducible astrological properties. While alchemists discovered some regularities 
concerning the production of acids and ceramics, chemistry explained these phe-
nomena and more.31 We reject irreducible alchemical properties because they do 
not explain any additional regularities that chemistry leaves behind. Irreducible 
moral properties explain phenomena if they succeed in providing unified ex-
planations of regularities that more fundamental properties do not. This deter-
mines whether they can figure in higher-level causation or program explanation.
Brink and Sayre-McCord argue that moral properties explain additional 
regularities, making ethics like psychology rather than astrology or alchemy.32 
Sayre-McCord claims that “certain regularities—for example, honesty’s en-
gendering trust or justice’s commanding allegiance, or kindness’s encouraging 
friendship—are real regularities that are unidentifiable and inexpressible except 
in terms of moral properties.”33 On Fodor’s view, we are justified in treating spe-
cial-science properties as more than mere heuristics because they explain addi-
tional regularities. Brink and Sayre-McCord claim that irreducible moral prop-
erties do so too.
Why must Brink and Sayre-McCord argue that moral properties explain non-
moral phenomena, as with justice engendering allegiance? Terence Cuneo de-
scribes how moral properties might explain moral phenomena, as when having 
a virtue causes someone to act rightly.34 Brink and Sayre-McCord must go fur-
ther and explain nonmoral phenomena because naturalists will reject putative 
special sciences with closed loops of irreducible properties that only causally 
explain each other. This rules out realms of spirits interacting only with each oth-
31 Morris, The Last Sorcerers.
32 Brink defends “the causal and, hence, explanatory irreducibility of higher-order facts—in-
cluding moral facts—to lower-order facts that constitute, but are not identical with, those 
higher-order facts” (Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, 197). For example, protest 
against the South African government is better explained in terms of its injustice than by the 
particular laws it passed, because different unjust laws would have resulted in similar protest 
(Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, 195).
33 Sayre-McCord, “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence,” 276.
34 Cuneo, “Moral Facts as Configuring Causes.” At the end, he suggests further application to 
nonmoral explanations.
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er, but does not rule out psychological properties. When race car drivers desire 
to win races and believe that they can win by accelerating, this explains not only 
the psychological event of their intending to accelerate, but the nonpsychologi-
cal event of cars accelerating. Similar cross-domain explanations are ubiquitous. 
Economic events like industrialization explain geophysical events like climate 
change, which explain biological events like extinctions. Moral properties must 
do the same, or they will be as eliminable from our ontology as realms of spirits.
This takes us back to familiar debates about the explanatory potency of ir-
reducible moral properties, but with a clearer view of the central question: do 
they explain additional regularities? Let us consider Sayre-McCord’s claim that 
justice engenders allegiance. This generalization also has a merely psychological 
explanation. People desire that they and others be treated justly, and believe that 
allegiance to the just makes just treatment more likely. For justice’s engender-
ing allegiance to support the irreducibility of moral properties, morality has to 
provide a unified explanation of regularities that psychology does not explain. If 
we consider the reasons for regarding psychology as irreducible to neuroscience, 
and for positing chemical properties that are not alchemical properties, we can 
see two ways for moral explanations to have such an advantage. Justice could 
systematically engender allegiance in creatures lacking beliefs and desires. Or it 
could systematically engender allegiance in creatures whose beliefs and desires 
do not support psychological explanations of allegiance. I consider both options, 
explain how they parallel good defenses of irreducible special-science properties, 
and argue that they fail.
First, justice might systematically engender allegiance even in creatures that 
lack human psychological states like beliefs and desires, paralleling how psy-
chology explains even robot behavior.35 Neuroscience cannot explain robot 
behavior, since robots have other structures instead of brains. Psychology does 
so, supporting its irreducibility to neuroscience. Moral explanations of creatures 
without humanlike psychology would justify ethics as an irreducible special sci-
ence by explaining phenomena in which psychology does not apply. This would 
be the best case for nonreductionists, as it would make their position perfectly 
analogous to Fodor’s.
Sadly, justice does not systematically engender allegiance in creatures with-
out our psychological architecture. Being just to amoebas and bees does not 
engender their allegiance. Creatures without humanlike psychologies do not 
systematically respond to moral properties, except perhaps in ways that scien-
tific properties already explain. Psychology explains regularities that neurosci-
ence does not address and that physics handles with disunity. But ethics has no 
35 Some robots, like the Mars Rover, have a belief-desire-intention architecture.
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similar advantages over psychology and sociology. Nonreductionists do not ex-
plicitly defend moral explanations of amoeba and bee behavior. They probably 
have not recognized that their arguments require these bad explanations to suc-
ceed. But if psychology is not reducible to neuroscience because its laws apply to 
creatures without humanlike brains, parallel arguments against reducing moral 
properties to psychological properties require moral laws to apply to creatures 
without humanlike psychologies.
Second, justice might systematically engender allegiance in creatures psy-
chologically like us, but whose beliefs and desires do not suggest a psychological 
explanation of justice’s engendering allegiance. Then psychology would fail to 
explain some regularities. If moral theories filled this gap, systematically explain-
ing regularities that other special sciences did not, that would justify belief in 
irreducible moral properties. Belief in chemical properties similarly is justified 
by their ability to systematically explain regularities that alchemy does not.
Empirical evidence suggests that ethics does not fill any such gaps left by oth-
er sciences. If it did so, social scientists would invoke irreducible moral proper-
ties to explain regularities that scientific properties did not explain. But as Brian 
Leiter writes, “moral facts appear to play no role in any developed explanatory 
theory. . . . While, for example, there are Marxist historians using broadly ‘eco-
nomic’ facts to explain historical events, there is no school of ‘moral historians’ 
using moral facts to do any interesting or complex explanatory work.”36 Current 
practice in the social sciences suggests that irreducible moral properties play no 
useful role in explaining regularities. Social scientists instead use psychological 
or sociological explanations that invoke economic or cultural facts.37 Histories 
36 Leiter, “Moral Facts and Best Explanations.” Majors misunderstands the problem Leiter 
raises, taking it to be “that no moral generalization will be exceptionless” (“Moral Expla-
nation in the Special Sciences,” 150). That indeed would not be a problem. Fodor writes, 
“Intentional psychology is a special (i.e., nonbasic) science, so its laws are ceteris paribus 
laws. And ceteris paribus laws tolerate exceptions, so long as the exceptions are unsystematic” 
(The Elm and the Expert, 39). Leiter’s point is that moral generalizations fail systematically 
enough to make them useless, so that social scientists must invoke nonmoral natural facts 
instead. Cuneo notes that explanations of empirical phenomena are incomplete and some-
times “it is just not obvious what these natural facts are,” (“Moral Facts as Configuring Caus-
es,” 154). But psychologists, sociologists, and economists are discovering these natural facts, 
and moral facts do not seem to be among them.
37 Might ethics develop in such a way that moral facts would explain psychological or sociolog-
ical events, contrary to current psychological or sociological methodology? As Parfit notes, 
“Non-Religious Ethics is at a very early stage,” and we should be open-minded about how it 
will develop (Reasons and Persons, 454). But there is plenty of room for open-mindedness 
without expecting ethics to overturn the methodology of better-understood empirical dis-
ciplines.
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in which irreducible moral properties exert pressure on political events, system-
atically pushing toward better outcomes, are pejoratively labeled “Whig history” 
and rejected along with the nineteenth-century school of historiography that 
provides the name.38
While psychology does not have systematic exceptions that moral general-
izations explain, the moral generalizations suggested by nonreductionists have 
systematic exceptions that psychology explains. To return to Sayre-McCord’s 
example, those who profit from injustice often align themselves with the unjust 
rather than the just. It is unclear how moral explanations would explain this reg-
ularity. Psychology explains it—their desire to profit from injustice exceeds their 
desire for justice. In this and other cases, moral generalizations have systematic 
exceptions that psychology explains, but not vice versa.39
Frederick Engels claimed that justice was “social phlogiston.”40 In trying to 
make irreducible moral properties explain social regularities just as chemists 
before Lavoisier tried to make phlogiston explain combustion, nonreduction-
ism fails just as phlogiston theories failed. Error theory then defeats naturalistic 
moral realism.
Reductionism saves ethics from this misfortune. It treats moral properties 
as identical to scientific properties that explain phenomena, answering the chal-
lenge that we have no reason to believe in moral properties because the best 
explanations of our observations do not entail their existence. Harman, who 
famously brought this challenge against the Cornell Realists, allows that reduc-
tionism answers it.41 After discussing an example in which Jane believes that 
Albert has done something wrong after seeing him beat his cat, Harman writes, 
“certain naturalistic reductions of wrongness might enable us to explain how the 
wrongness of Albert’s action could help to explain Jane’s disapproval of it.”42 If 
wrongness is identical to causing pain, and causing pain explains Jane’s disap-
proval, wrongness explains Jane’s disapproval.43 While disjunctions of natural 
38 In The Whig Interpretation of History, Butterfield provides a classic criticism of Whig history.
39 Consider Brink’s example of apartheid ending in South Africa. On a psychological explana-
tion, other restrictions regarded as unjust would have generated indignation, causing pro-
test and instability. Moral and psychological explanations differ about what would happen if 
everyone regarded South Africa’s injustices as just, perhaps because of racism among whites 
and internalized oppression among blacks. Moral explanations implausibly predict that 
there still would have been instability and protest.
40 Engels, “The Housing Question.”
41 Harman, “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.”
42 Harman, “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts,” 63.
43 Railton proposes a “reduction basis” for moral value (“Moral Realism,” 142) and later sym-
pathetically considers the view I accept—a goodness/pleasure property identity on the 
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kinds may not provide a unified explanation of any one regularity, each disjunct 
provides a unified explanation of some regularity. Then wrongness can be iden-
tical to a disjunction of natural kinds, as jade is. Even if wrongness does not ex-
plain any regularity, its disjuncts each explain regularities, entailing its existence.
Nonreductionists cannot construct an analogous position on which irreduc-
ible moral properties supervene on arbitrary disjunctions of realizers. The way 
irreducible properties can inherit the causal powers of their supervenience bas-
es might seem to suggest such a position, as nonreductionist theories of men-
tal causation typically involve higher-level properties exercising causal powers 
through lower-level realizers.44 But these higher-level properties explain addi-
tional regularities, unlike irreducible moral properties.
How can we discover which scientific properties are identical to moral prop-
erties? Many answers are possible. Brink’s favored method of reflective equilibri-
um works just as well for reductionists as for nonreductionists. The moral theory 
that results from reflective equilibrium can be treated as a synthetic identity.
Unsurprisingly, moral properties fare better when they do not have to explain 
regularities beyond those of scientific properties and can simply be identified 
with elements of existing scientific explanations, as reductionism allows. Our 
interest in ethics is not about providing new, unified explanations of natural 
phenomena. We care about rightness, virtue, and goodness whether or not they 
explain additional regularities. We want to act rightly, be virtuous, and make the 
world a better place. It would be neat if moral properties explained regularities 
that scientific properties did not, but that is not why we care about them. Mor-
al concepts leave open which phenomena moral properties explain, or whether 
they explain any at all.
Then why do naturalistic moral realists care about explanations? It is because 
water/H2O model (“Naturalism and Prescriptivity,” 157). He argues that moral properties 
can explain things that beliefs about the properties cannot explain. His reductionism helps 
his moral explanations succeed, since moral properties that reduce to scientific properties 
explain whatever the scientific properties explain. This goes beyond what moral or scientific 
beliefs about the properties explain.
44 See Bennett, “Mental Causation.” This avoids problems Elizabeth Tropman discusses about 
knowing moral facts “via inferences from the best explanation of some observed phenome-
non,” “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” 33. Perhaps 
nonreductionist ambitions of explaining additional regularities prevented Joseph Long 
from invoking reflective equilibrium in response (“In Defence of Cornell Realism”). Reduc-
tionists do not require goodness to provide unified explanations of additional regularities 
that scientific properties cannot provide. While Lei Zhong (“An Explanatory Challenge to 
Moral Reductionism”) is right that error theory and reductionism are equally simple, deep, 
and unified, reductionism gains an advantage in reflective equilibrium through its coher-
ence with our existing moral beliefs.
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of their broader epistemological commitments, not because of anything specific 
to morality. They are happy to believe in whatever the best explanations invoke 
or entail, and reluctant to believe in anything else. While they may accept that it 
is conceptually possible for there to be moral properties that do not explain any-
thing, they deny that there is reason to believe in them. By identifying goodness 
with scientific properties or their disjunctions, reductionism makes our explana-
tions entail its existence so that naturalists can believe in it.
Readers may be wondering how my explanatory arguments fit with the pre-
vious ones concerning multiple realizability. To solve multiple realizability for 
pluralism, I gave goodness a disjunctive reduction base that could not provide 
unified explanations. Then I argued against irreducible goodness on grounds 
that it does not add to our unified explanations of regularities. But how does a 
disjunctive reduction base avoid this problem? Why accept reductions of good-
ness to disjunctive bases that do not provide unified explanations, while reject-
ing irreducible goodness for not providing unified explanations? The answer is 
that if pluralism prevents goodness from doing unified explanatory work, only 
reductionism allows our scientific and normative ethical theories to jointly en-
tail that there is goodness in the world.
Our best explanations invoke some things, entail the existence of disjunc-
tions of the things invoked, and cast doubt on the existence of things that do 
not fit the data. Suppose normative ethics treats pleasure and democracy as the 
two good things, and metaethics commits us to the objectivity of their value. 
Nonreductionism then suggests understanding goodness as being constituted 
by pleasure or democracy but not identical to them. The existence of pleasure or 
democracy does not entail that anything fits that description, and the suggested 
empirical effects of this irreducible property do not fit our social-scientific ob-
servations. So we should reject such an irreducible property. Our explanations 
invoke only scientific properties, and entail that there are disjunctions of these 
properties. On a reductionist construal, the above ethical theory suggests that 
goodness is identical to pleasure or democracy. Even if this disjunction is too 
disunified to explain anything and is not a property on the sparse view, the exis-
tence of either disjunct entails its existence. So the reductionist construal of this 
ethical theory and our scientific ontology jointly entail moral realism.
Jade is identical to jadeite or nephrite. Jade does no unified explanatory 
work. But wherever there is jadeite or nephrite, there is jade. If reductionism is 
true and the true normative ethical theory says pleasure and democracy are the 
two good things, goodness is identical to pleasure or democracy. If either exists, 
there is goodness in the world.
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3. Happy Ending
I conclude by explaining why Cornell Realists should be happy to accept reduc-
tionism.
One does not accept nonreductionism for its own sake. One accepts it to 
address multiple realizability. Contrast the reasons to accept the rest of Cornell 
Realism. We might accept that our moral concepts demand objectivity because 
we feel that nothing less would count as genuine moral value. We might accept 
moral realism because error theory is so unappealing. We might accept natural-
ism because nonnatural moral facts are epistemically dubious and ontologically 
extravagant. We might accept externalism about moral judgment because it is 
possible for Satan to be rational, fully understand evil, and wholeheartedly do 
evil for evil’s sake. By contrast, nothing directly pushes us toward nonreduction-
ism. We want wrongness to be instantiated across infinite disjunctions at the lev-
el of physics and when ghosts torture other ghosts. But if reductionism delivers 
these results, nonreductionism has no further appeal. Moreover, reductionism 
answers Harman’s objections, making our scientific explanations entail the exis-
tence of things that make moral belief true.
The simplicity of reductionism should attract naturalistically minded philos-
ophers like the Cornell Realists. Einstein writes, “It can scarcely be denied that 
the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple 
and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation 
of a single datum of experience.”45 Sometimes we have to abandon simple theo-
ries because they fail to explain the phenomena. But when a view like reduction-
ism explains everything, it delivers the supreme goal of all theory.46
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45 Einstein, “On the Method of Theoretical Physics.”
46 For helpful questions and comments, I thank audiences at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 
the Zagreb Institute of Philosophy, the Creighton Club, the University of Western Australia, 
the University of California at San Diego, the University of Erfurt, the Naturalism and 
Normativity in the Social Sciences Conference, Nanyang Technological University, the 
University of Texas at Austin, Southern Methodist University, the University of Houston, 
the University of Florida, the UNC Metaethics Working Group, the University of Cincinnati, 
the University of Puget Sound, the University of Tennessee, and the Australasian Association 
of Philosophy. Dan Korman and Nicholas Laskowski also offered helpful feedback. 
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